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The Tunisian Transition:  
The Evolving Face of the  
Second Republic
 Fatima El-Issawi
The swift victory of moderate Islamists at the first free elections in the historically secular 
Tunisia left a bitter taste for the losers. After three interim governments and amid a vast on-
going legal and institutional reform process, Tunisia can be considered as a positive example 
of a non-violent and functional transitional phase from dictatorship towards democracy. 
Although peaceful, the Tunisian transition is characterised by a fierce debate between the 
secular (‘leftist’ to its opponents) and the religious camps (satirically dubbed the Long Bearded 
by the secular discourse). This unfolding confrontation forms the backdrop to the process of 
drafting a new constitution, amid anxiety surrounding the place of Islam in the new political 
system. However, fears of the resurrection of a new theocratic dictatorship are mitigated by 
a dynamic civil society in which voices that were silenced or misused by the former regime of 
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali are becoming distinctly vocal. Yet despite the role of religion in society 
dominating discussion both in Tunisia and internationally, for all sides in the debate it will be 
the economic recovery that forms the major challenge of the post-Ben Ali era. 
THE JASMINE REVOLUTION ONE YEAR ON
Three interim governments have held office since the departure of Ben Ali, with each facing angry 
demonstrations calling for a total departure from the old regime. The election of a National Constituent 
Assembly tasked with reforming Tunisia’s constitution was delayed from July to October 2011, with the 
need for more time cited in order to prepare for a ‘credible vote’. The implicit logic behind this delay 
was the fear of an overwhelming victory for Islamists in early elections, and indeed the Islamist Ennahda 
party secured 40 per cent of the vote, winning 90 seats in the 217-member parliament. This victory is 
continuously downplayed by secular parties, which describe it as not reflective of Tunisian society, on 
the basis of the relatively disappointing 50 percent turnout and the Ennahda’s inability to secure an 
absolute majority. 
Following the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia embarked upon a complex reform process led by 
consultative bodies formed of technocrats and well-known Tunisian figures. This process began with the 
constitution of the ‘High Council for the Realisation of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reforms, and 
Democratic Transition’, tasked with reforming the Tunisian State through a process of legislative change. 
Under this remit, different committees were formed to tackle diverse reforms. An Electoral Commission 
with an independent statute set the practical framework for elections with great efficiency, implementing 
provisions such as the parity of men and women as candidates, a proportional voting system and the 
prohibition of certain candidates with ties to the old regime. The parity between men and women led 
to the election of 49 women in the Constituent Assembly, most of them from the Ennahda party. 
19
The aftermath of the Ben Ali era witnessed the 
legalisation of more than 106 political parties, most of 
them unknown to the Tunisian voters, with the media 
and political spheres opened up to the previously 
outlawed opposition. The general amnesty law for 
political prisoners allowed the release of more than 
500 political prisoners, most of whom were facing 
charges under counterterrorism laws. New decree-
laws on associations and political parties eliminate 
important restrictions on political activity, including 
the crime of ‘membership in’ or ‘providing services 
to’ an unrecognised organisation, a provision that had 
been used to imprison thousands of opposition party 
activists. At the same time, an article was abrogated 
that had stated that a party may not base its principles, 
activities or programmes on a religion, language, race, 
sex or region; a provision that had been aimed at 
restricting the access of Islamists to the political sphere.
The media sector was one of the major objects of 
reform as Tunisia had previously operated one the 
most repressive media systems in the Arab world in 
terms of both freedom of expression and political 
independence. A new press code eliminated prison 
terms for nearly all speech offences except incitement 
to robbery and racial or religious hatred. The draft 
code preserves defamation as a criminal offence, 
although it replaces prison terms with fines. It also 
retains the offence of distributing ‘false information’, a 
concept that the Ben Ali government used to prosecute 
numerous dissidents and human rights activists. Yet the 
most problematic element of the new code surrounds 
criminal restrictions on content which were frequently 
used under the former regime to oppress journalists. 
The arrest of Nasreddine Ben Saida, the publisher 
of the Arabic-language daily Attounissia, as well as 
the newspaper’s editor and one of its journalists, for 
printing a photo of a German-Tunisian football player 
embracing a naked model on the front-page sparked 
an outrage in the media community. 
THE NEW POLITICAL ARENA 
The results achieved by the moderate Islamist Ennahda 
party exceeded both expectations and fears. The party 
led by Rachid Ghannouchi, who returned to Tunisia 
in January 2011 following the interim government’s 
announcement of a general amnesty, was granted 
legal status as a political party in March. Initially formed 
as the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in 1981, 
the party’s relationship with the regime deteriorated 
dramatically, leading to the imprisonment of most of 
its senior figures. The surprising popular support the 
party secured in the 1989 parliamentary elections 
– despite its members running as independent 
candidates – precipitated a harsh crackdown by the 
regime that culminated in Ben Ali accusing Ennahda of 
orchestrating an attack on a ruling party office in 1991. 
Tunisian military courts subsequently convicted 265 of 
the party’s members on charges of planning a coup. 
The results of the first free elections in the post-Ben 
Ali era confirmed Ennahda’s popularity. The party 
capitalised upon its long-running grassroots policies 
as well as its organisational ability to run a successful 
electoral campaign, in contrast to its inexperienced, 
divided and mostly unknown opponents. As the 
Economist noted, Ennahda’s ‘identification with 
working-class authenticity in contrast to Tunisia’s 
traditional Francophone elite’ was crucial to its success. 
However, this is far from a comfortable victory. 
Ennahda’s cohabitation with two political parties – 
the Congress for the Republic (30 seats) and Ettakatol 
party (21 seats) – of secular background is a challenge 
in itself. Moreover, the Islamist party is coming under 
tight scrutiny, with secular groups regaining their voice 
following their humiliating electoral defeat.  A new 
secular coalition was recently announced that brings 
together two leftist parties (Attajdid and Renewal) 
with the Tunisian labour party and some independent 
candidates, yet without a clear program or popular 
base. The constituent assembly led by the tri-partite 
coalition is embarking on the difficult challenge of 
drafting Tunisia’s new constitution. In terms of the 
model for the new political system, Ennahda, the 
largest single party, is advocating a parliamentary 
system along the lines of the UK, in which the Prime 
Minister would be appointed by the party securing 
the largest number of seats in Parliament. 
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For the fragmented secularists, united in support of 
a mixte system copying France, this would deprive 
minority parties of the opportunity to form a majority 
coalition and therefore lead the government. 
Alongside these divisions over democratic models, the 
main debate is centred on how Islam law or values 
will be understood within the new political system. 
While the place of Islam was always recognised in 
the Tunisian constitution implemented by President 
Bourguiba in 1959, it was expressed in an ambiguous 
way, which served to facilitate its marginalisation. 
The first article of the old constitution stipulates that 
‘Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign, its 
religion is Islam, its language Arabic and its regime 
a republic’. However, does this mean that Islam is 
the religion of the Tunisian society or that of the 
State itself? This confusion is best reflected by the 
divide between two Tunisias: the traditional Tunisia of 
conservative Islam and the Francophile Tunisia inspired 
by the secular colonial regime and from which the 
new Tunisian technocrats are drawn. 
Views about the implementation of Sharia law range 
between direct calls for Sharia as the main source of 
legislation and proposals to discuss the constitution 
in the Arab-Islamic heritage of Tunisia. Ennahda 
finally stepped into the ongoing struggle between 
the two camps by declaring that it will not back calls 
by ultra-conservatives to impose Sharia as the main 
source of legislation in the new constitution, instead 
retaining the first article of the old constitution. The 
leader of the party Rached Ghannoushi explained 
the decision in terms of giving priority to preserving 
the unity of Tunisian society and an understanding of 
the Constitution as the fruit of broad consensus. This 
stance simultaneously angered Salafi, who considered 
it treason to Ennahda’s religious commitments, and 
failed to allay the concerns of secularists, who remain 
sceptical of the nature of the long-term project of 
the Islamists.  
Ennahda’ decision to renounce Sharia came after 
the leader of the party for the first time admitted 
the difference between secularism and atheism, 
thereby legitimating the role of secular parties in 
Tunisian politics. The Ennahda leader had tried on 
several occasions to appease fears that a radical 
version of Sharia could be embedded in the new 
constitution, giving assurances to Reuters that there 
will be no religion in Tunisia’s planned changes to the 
constitution, and that the party will instead focus on 
democracy, human rights and a free-market economy.
Nevertheless, the support of the radical Islamist Salafi 
in the coming crucial parliamentary and presidential 
elections is highly precious for Ennahda. It is not clear 
how this small vocal group voted in the October 2011 
elections, given the ambiguous relationship between 
the radical movement and Ennahda, considered by 
some Salafi as no less secular than the secular camp. Up 
to now, Ennahda leaders have adopted a conciliatory 
tone in addressing their violent actions, sometimes 
acting as an intermediary between the Salafi and their 
opponents to diffuse tensions. While avoiding tough 
action against the radical and mostly youth movement, 
Ennahda is not hiding its effort to provide them with a 
‘framework’. In statements to the press, Ourimi Ajmi, 
a member of the executive bureau of Ennahda, has 
confirmed the existence of a dialogue between the 
youth of Ennahda and that of Salafi, claiming that his 
party would represent ‘a good school’ for integrating 
young Salafi into the democratic norms of peaceful 
political engagement. In his latest statement, Rached 
Ghannoushi has remained conciliatory, characterising 
Salafi violence as ‘a reaction to the oppression’ they 
experienced under the former regime, and calling 
them ‘our sons’. Talking to Le Monde, Ghannoushi 
confirmed his willingness to bring Salafi under the 
umbrella of moderate Islam, and raised the possibility 
of starting negotiations with their sheikhs. 
RELIGION VERSUS SECULARISM
The divide over the role of religion in the new state was 
reflected in the commemoration of the first anniversary 
of the revolution when two separate crowds clashed 
in the streets, with the secular camp claiming the 
revolution had been hijacked by Islamists. Social media 
is the platform for the contest between the two camps, 
which use Facebook to spread accusations, rumours 
and libel. However, this struggle has frequently escaped 
cyber-space, with continuous clashes between Salafi 
groups and secularist demonstrators led mainly by the 
Tunisian union of labour, which is becoming the most 
vocal critic of the government’s policies. 
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The phobia of an Islamist state exhibited by the secular 
camp manifests itself in conspiratorial notions of secret 
plots aimed at the radicalisation of the country, and in 
which a hidden Qatari and Saudi role is overwhelmingly 
identified. The victory of Ennahda is not in itself a 
source of anxiety so much as what is perceived 
as a lax position towards the rise of radical Salafi 
groups. For Ennahda’s opponents, there is an implicit 
alliance between the two Islamist parties, allowing the 
empowerment of radical voices while the moderate 
governing party is appeasing international fears by 
adopting a low-profile discourse. Unconfirmed reports 
suggest Salafi control more than 500 mosques and 
religious schools, spreading a radical interpretation 
of Islam that challenges the authority of formal 
religious institutions and of Ennahda itself. In one 
instance, the town of Sejnane, north-west of Tunis, 
was briefly declared an ‘Islamic emirate’ when around 
200 Salafists took control and enforced the Islamic 
Sharia in its most radical interpretations. 
The continuous arm wrestling between Salafi and 
secularists over allowing veiled women into academic 
campuses is putting Ennahda in an embarrassing 
situation of having to avoid criticising both of the two 
opposing parties directly. The wearing of the niqab 
became a notable feature of Tunisian society after 
the Jasmine revolution. In 1981, President Bourguiba 
ratified a law banning women from wearing the 
hijab in state offices, and Ben Ali’s government in the 
1980s and 1990s issued more restrictive enactments, 
including the notorious 102 law, which considers 
the hijab a ‘sign of extremism’ and banned it. The 
increasingly heated debate over niqab-wearing in 
public institutions is seen by some as a deviation from 
the crucial issue of drafting the new constitution. 
Ennahda is attempting to maintain a low profile and 
avoid direct involvement, arguing that while the 
movement does not encourage women to wear the 
niqab, they support the principle of the freedom of 
the individual who chooses to wear it.
Preserving the rights gained under the secular state, 
particularly with regard to the personal status law, is 
another important struggle. Tunisia is considered the 
most advanced in the Arab world in terms of granting 
equal rights and status for women and men. Anxiety 
is mounting over the possibility of amendments to 
Tunisia’s code of secular protections should Sharia 
be adopted as a basis of the new constitution, but 
Ennahda continues to try to allay these fears, with 
senior officials being quoted as saying that ‘Ennahda 
is attached to the gains of the modern state and the 
rules established by the (code)’. The party previously 
supported the Code of Personal Status introduced in 
1956 that abolished polygamy and repudiation instead 
of formal divorce. It is important to note again that 
Ennahda confirmed its will not to impose Sharia as a 
main source for legislation in the new constitution.
OVERCOMING THE LEGACY OF THE BEN-ALI ERA
The reconciliation between the two clearly divided 
Tunisian societies and its ramifications will require a 
consensus about the place of religion and the political 
representation of different groups. However, the 
Ennahda-led coalition will ultimately be judged upon 
its ability to lead the country towards its recovery amid 
a deteriorated socio-economic condition. 
Tunisia has cut its economic growth forecast for this 
year to 3.5 percent, down from a previous forecast 
of 4.5 percent, primarily as a result of the decline 
in foreign investment and tourism following the 
revolution. According to figures of the National 
Institute of Statistics (INS), unemployment in the 
country reached 18.9 percent between the 2nd and 
4th quarter in 2011, a period during which the number 
of unemployed rose to 738,400, of which 60 percent 
are women. The continuous popular protest organized 
by the secular camp and led by the unions is widely 
considered to be an obstacle to the resumption of 
economic activity. The government has warned that 
the unions risk aggravating the economic situation, 
and are keenly aware that the continuing protests 
may cut into Islamist electoral success. According 
to the government, Tunisia’s Phosphate Mine and 
Chemical Group  has lost up to 1.2 billion dinars 
(around $790 million), with the prime minister 
Hamadi Jbali blaming strikes and protests which 
have blocked critical access roads leading in and 
out of Tunisia’s marginalized interior regions. The 
tourism industry, Tunisia’s biggest source of foreign 
currency, remains depressed.  Foreign tourist numbers 
in 2011 were down by about 2 million to 4.4 million. 
22
Earnings from tourism fell to 2.1 billion dinars ($1.4 
billion) last year from 3.2 billion dinars ($2.1 billion) in 
2010. 170 foreign enterprises have shut down their 
operations since 2010, although 3000 foreign firms 
continue to operate in the country. 
Ennahda’s economic strategy, focused on regenerating 
impoverished regions, is not achieving its targets, and 
as a result these areas are becoming the main reservoir 
of socio-economic dissent. For instant, in Gafsa, west 
central Tunisia, a large number of young unemployed 
people blocked the carriage of phosphate destined 
for export.  Protests demanding jobs and dignity 
have disrupted also the towns of Ghar Dimaou, Beja, 
Jendouba, Kairouan, Nabeul, Tataouine and Gafsa. 
In Sidi Makhlouf, 350km south of Tunis, protesters 
detained the provincial governor for several hours to 
press their demands for jobs.
The tendency of the new government to focus on 
financial aid has been severely criticized as an inefficient 
means of reviving the economy and correcting the 
legacy of decades of entrenched corruption. It is also 
viewed by the secular camp as a threat to Tunisia’s 
integrity, with the close relationship between the 
new government and the emirate of Qatar fuelling 
accusations that Tunisia is becoming a puppet of the 
wealthy Gulf state.    
Whilst the economic situation remains key, the heavy 
legacy of the old dictatorship leaves several other 
challenges that are still to be met by the provisional 
government. In June 2011, Ben Ali and his wife were 
convicted in absentia of theft and unlawful possession 
of cash and jewellery. They were sentenced to 35 years 
in prison and given a $65 million fine. Although the 
former ruling party has been dismantled, there is a 
solid institutional structure that is still in control of 
administrative institutions. Not much has been done 
in implementing transitional justice, which remains a 
major challenge for the post-Ben Ali phase. The fact 
finding commission that was formed directly after 
the revolution to investigate the corruption under the 
former regime reported more than 10,000 submissions, 
over half of which were investigated and some 320 files 
were transferred to the public prosecutor, although 
according to its final report many of the important 
files require more time and effort to be investigated. 
However, the activity of the commission ended with 
the death of its president, and there remains a firm 
belief among secularists that the Ennahda party is 
not really working for the ‘purification’ of public 
institutions from Ben Ali technocrats. At the same time, 
it is in the best interests of the new administration to 
try and bring on board these experienced civil servants 
in order to assert its control over public administration.
Success in organising trustworthy elections is not 
sufficient to lay solid foundations for the democratic 
Tunisian Republic. Tunisia needs to bring about 
a radical change of practice that will prevent the 
development of new client networks serving new 
rulers but following the corrupt model of Ben Ali’s 
regime. There are fears that new networks will be 
nurtured by the Ennahda party in its bid to assert 
control over the State. Tunisians are prone to repeat 
that the autocratic regime did not flee the country in 
the same plane that took Ben Ali and his wife away 
to Saudi Arabia. That system is deeply entrenched 
in Tunisian public administration, where a culture of 
privilege still flourishes. There are few signs that the 
new ruling elite is departing from these practices. 
As for the secular camp, its failure to bring together 
efforts to counter the Islamists’ rise during the elections 
of the Constituent Assembly has apparently not acted 
as a wake-up call. The political negativity of the 
secularists, who in the absence of a clear programme 
for the transition are united only by their criticism of 
Ennahda, is in itself an indicator of a possible failure 
in the coming general elections. The continuous focus 
on relatively trivial battles such as niqab wearing for 
women or Salafi violence is a distraction from the main 
issue of preserving the gains of the secular Republic 
while regaining the trust of the Tunisian public. The 
much-needed reconciliation between the two divided 
Tunisian societies, Islamist and secular, requires a 
recognition of each camp by the other. This cannot 
be achieved without a serious and exhaustive revision 
of the legacy of the Ben Ali regime. ■
